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The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating
Agency Failures in the Build Up to the
Financial Crisis
KIA DENNISt
ABSTRACT

This article posits that the rating agencies' underestimation of the
risks of mortgage backed securities was an economically rational
response to legal, regulatory, and market incentives. In particular, revenues from rating mortgage backed securities and other structured finance
products grew exponentially between 2001 and 2006, so much so that by
2006, these ratings accounted for a significant part of rating agencies'
total revenues. At the same time, however, the costs of inaccurate certification were declining as a result of judicial and regulatory actions favoring limited rating agency liability. As a consequence the benefits of
overrating mortgage backed securities were greater than the costs of
doing so. With this as a basis for understanding rating agency behavior
in the months and years preceding the credit crisis, the article comments
on the proposed regulatory overhaul and suggests additional liability be
imposed on rating agencies.
INTRODUCTION

It seems apparent now that the real estate boom that swept the
country between 2001 and 2006 was actually a real estate bubble. Rising
home values, flexible loan products, and a government focus on increasing home ownership encouraged an increasing number of borrowers to
purchase homes or to take home equity loans.' Both the markets for
t Fellow, University of Baltimore School of Law. I thank Jim Kelly, Michelle Gilman,
Cassandra Havard, Audrey McFarlane, Gilda Daniels, and Odeana Neal for their encouragement
and their comments on earlier drafts and Ryan McGovern for his research assistance. I am also
extremely grateful for the encouragement and support of Neil Dennis and Delria Johnson. Funding
for this article was provided by a University of Baltimore School of Law Summer Research
Fellowship.
1. See Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 5
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 22-23 (2008) (discussing the proliferation of innovative mortgage
products); see also Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital Markets,
Fed. Res. Bank S.F. Econ. Letter (Dec. 28, 2001) available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/
economicsfletter/2001/e12001-38.html ("During the 1990s, the economic expansion was
accompanied by a rapid increase in consumer debt, and the concomitant boosts to house values
continued to encourage home equity borrowing in particular."). Home prices began appreciating
considerably in 2003 but fell of dramatically in 2006. See OFFICE OF FED. HOUSING ENTERPRISE
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mortgage backed securities as well as the residential real estate market
in general showed the classic signs of imminent collapse. Mortgage borrowers and investors appeared to believe that the prices and values of
homes would rise infinitum. Investors purchased mortgage backed
securities at a fevered pace. Over 75% of the subprime mortgages
originated in the first quarter of 2007 were packaged and sold as mortgage backed securities.2 Investors continued to purchase these securities
even as evidence mounted suggesting that homes were being overpriced
and that the mortgages backing those securities were becoming increasingly risky.'
Prices, of course, did not continue to rise and mortgage defaults
skyrocketed in 2007, triggering a worldwide recession. ' In June 2007,
OVERSIGHT, WIDESPREAD HOUSE PRICE DECLINES IN FOURTH QUARTER at 6 (February 26, 2008),
available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/4q07hpi.pdf.
2. Securitization Takes Huge Bite of Early 2007 Mortgage Originationsas Bank Retained
Portfolios Shrink, INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, June 29, 2007.
3. See e.g., Karen Sibayan, Fitch Announces New Subprime Mortgage Product, ASSET

(April 21, 2003); Mark Zandi, Household Lending From Here to 2020,
Statistical Data Included, J.LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT., September 1, 1999; Bonnie
SECURITIZATION REPORT

Sinnock, Originators Securitized 65% of IQ Production, ORIGINATION NEWS,August 25, 2003, at
1 (referencing the concerns of some in the lending industry that underwriting standards have
weakened and changing economic circumstances may lead to increased losses in the subprime

sector); Ted Cornwell, Rising Interest Rates Portend Early Defaults,

MORTGAGE SERVICING NEWS,

August 1, 2000 at 1 (raising concerns that rising interest rates will lead to increased mortgage
defaults); Fitch Announces New Subprime Mortgage Product, Asset Securitization Report, April
21, 2003; Ted Cornwell, "Are MBS Getting Riskier? Loans May Falter in a Downturn, NATIONAL
MORTGAGE NEWS, Jan. 31, 2000 (raising concerns about the loan to value ratio and whether
subprime loans will continue to perform well if the economy cools) ; Collateral Values Tend to
Shrink When Subprime Mortgage Go Bad, NATION MORTGAGE NEWS, March 8, 1999 (discussing
the unreliability of appraisals on homes financed with subprime loans). In fact, problems in the
mortgage backed securities industry, especially with respect to subprime loans, had begun to
surface as early as the late 1990s. Industry insiders raised questions about the loan to value ratios
of subprime loans, rising interest rates, overestimated home appraisals, and the general weakening
of subprime underwriting. Financial regulators began to observe a relaxation in underwriting and

noted a concomitant increase in risk. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
CREDIT UNDERWRITING PRACTICES

2007, October 2007;

OF THE CURRENCY, SURVEY OF

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE

CURRENCY, SURVEY OF CREDIT UNDERWRITING PRACTICES

2006, October 2006;

OFFICE OF THE

2005, October
2005.
4. The delinquency rate for subprime loans was 13.77% in the first quarter of 2007.
Delinquencies Decrease in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey, Mortgage Bankers
Association, June 14, 2007. This represents a 44 basis point increase over the prior quarter and a
227 basis point year over year increase. By way of comparison, the delinquency rate for prime
loans in the first quarter of 2007 was 2.58% representing a 1 basis point increase from the prior
quarter and a 33 basis point year over year increase. Id. As of the first quarter of 2008, the
delinquency rate for subprime loans stood at 18.67% a 12 basis point decrease over the prior
quarter and a 385 basis point year over year increase. Prime delinquencies stood at 3.93%, a 22
basis point increase over the prior quarter and a 120 basis point increase over the prior year.
Delinquenciesand Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA NationalDelinquency Survey, Mortgage
Bankers Association, September 5, 2008.
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SURVEY OF CREDIT UNDERWRITING PRACTICES
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investors' confidence began to falter as a result of announcements by
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) and Standard and Poor's (S&P),
the two largest bond rating agencies, that they would be downgrading
hundreds of subprime mortgage backed securities.5 Although the downgrades represented a fraction of the total outstanding subprime mortgage
backed securities, these downgrades resulted in a shift in investor sentiment reaching far beyond the specific downgraded securities. Concerns
about the quality of the rating agencies' evaluation of mortgage backed
securities as well as the quality of ratings on other asset backed instruments grew.6 Investors all over the globe have experienced sizable
losses as a result of their holdings of mortgage backed securities and
other subprime and mortgage related debt.7 Noted economist and New
York University Stern Business School Professor Nouriel Roubini estimates losses could reach 3.6 trillion for U.S. institutions. 8
5. Standard & Poor's, 612 U.S. Subprime RMBS Classes Put on Watch Neg; Methodology
Revisions Announced (July 10, 2007); Serena Ng & Ruth Simon, Ratings Cuts By S&P, Moody's
Rattle Investors, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2007, at Al.
6. Several lawsuits have been filed against rating agencies arising out of subprime crisis. See
e.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan, 581 F. Supp. 2d. 581
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (alleging rating agencies assigned higher than warranted ratings to mortgage
backed securities). The rating agencies have also been sued by their shareholders alleging
violations of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 for misrepresenting or failing to disclose that the
agency had assigned higher than warranted ratings to mortgage backed securities and other asset
backed securities. See In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Risk
spreads on most securities and credit instruments increased. See Bonnie Sinnock, Heavy Selling
Seen Widening MBS Spreads to 1986 Level, National Mortgage News, March 10, 2008, available
at http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/premium/archive/?id=158952.(discussing the growing
spread between agency mortgage backed securities and Treasuries); John W. Snow, Medicine for
an Ailing Economy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2007, at A11; Leslie Wines, 'Fear Trade' Pushes
Treasurys Higher, MARKETWATCH, July 26, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/
news/story/treasurys-rally-weak-stocks-corporate/story.aspx?guid=%7BFF04747D%2D8B56%2D
43A9%2DAE93%2D9CC5CE417397%7D (discussing the widening spread between Treasuries
and corporate bonds); Jenny Anderson, Another New York Attorney General Starts a Wall Street
Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C6 (In July 2007 some subprime-linked collateralized debt
obligations were trading at spreads of 240 basis points over the London interbank offered rate last
March.).
7. Investment banks lost money because they were holding mortgage and mortgage-backed
securities that they had not yet securitized and sold. Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics
of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, BERKELEY Bus. L.J., Vol. 6, Fall
2009 at 47 (forthcoming 2009). Losses at commercial banks are estimated at approximately $400
billion. Carrick Mollenkamp & Neil Shah, Market's Tumult: Fortis Sets Plan to Raise $13 Billion,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at C2. Pension fund are estimated to have lost $2 trillion dollars
between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 2008. The Impact of the Financial
Crisis on Workers' Retirement Security: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Ed. & Lab., 110th
Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orzag, Director of the Cong. Budget Office). Hedge funds
posed their worst losses since 1997 according to EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research.
Funds of fund lost 17% in 2008. EDHEC RISK AND ASSET MANAGEMENT RESEARCH CENTER,
HEDGE FUND PERFORMANCE IN 2008 (2009).
8. Henry Meyer & Ayesha Daya, Roubini Predicts U.S. Losses May Reach $3.6 Trillion,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.comapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=as0
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As losses mount, lawmakers and angry investors have demanded
answers from the investment banks that sold these securities, the asset
managers that invested in the securities, the companies that insured these
securities and the regulators that were supposed to be overseeing these
entities.9 In addition, a good deal of investor anger has been focused on
the credit rating agencies that analyzed the credit risk of these mortgage
backed securities and generally rated them highly.
The rating agencies face charges that they deliberately underestimated the risks of mortgage backed securities in pursuit of their own self
interests and to the detriment of the interests of investors, and ultimately
the market. Most of the criticism is aimed at weaknesses in the models
and methodologies used in determining ratings and the failure of the
rating agencies to respond to declines in underwriting and loan quality.
These failures have renewed inquiries into whether rating agencies
should be more closely regulated.
The dominant view concerning regulation of the rating agencies is
based upon the "reputational-capital" theory, which holds that an
agency's success is primarily a result of the agency's track record in
issuing accurate ratings. If investors believe that an agency's ratings are
inaccurate they will stop relying upon those ratings and the agency's
profits will suffer. Thus, the agency's interest in maintaining a reputation for accurate ratings will be sufficient incentive to insure accurate
ratings and regulation is unnecessary.
Despite the general acceptance of the reputational capital view of
rating agency regulation, policymakers have on several occasions
inquired into whether regulation and oversight of the rating agencies
should be increased.' ° Lawmakers have recognized several discrete
issues that undermine rating agencies' performance. These include a
lack of transparency regarding the procedures and methodologies used
in issuing a rating, conflicts of interests arising out of the fact that agencies are paid by the issuers of the instruments they are hired to rate, and
yBnMR3USK. The International Monetary Fund estimated losses from bad U.S. debt alone could
reach $2.2 trillion dollars. Tom Barkley, IMF Dims Its Economic Outlook but Says Recovery Can
Start By Years End, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at A8.
9. See The FinancialCrisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing before H. Comm.
On Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing]; Hearing on the
Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout: Hearing Before Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform, 110th Cong. (2008); Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Recent Regulatory
Responses: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I I0th Cong.
(2008); Regulatory Restructuringand Reform of the FinancialSystem: Hearing Before H, Comm.
on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2008).
10. See, e.g., Disclosure of Security Ratings, 59 FR 46304 ( proposed Sept. 7, 1994)
(proposing rules that would mandate the disclosure of ratings for structured finance securities);
Role of the Rating Agencies, infra note 22 (the possibility of increasing oversight of NRSROs is
discussed throughout)
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regulatory dependency upon ratings.' Following the corporate scandals
typified by Enron and WorldCom, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the primary regulatory body for rating agencies, proposed a
number of rules designed to address these issues' 2 . In 2006, Congress
took up the mantle and enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
(the "Act") which required that a rating agency disclose its procedures
for issuing ratings and mandated that rating agencies have policies in
place to manage conflicts of interest. 3 The Act also gave the SEC the
power to suspend or revoke an agency's designation as an NRSRO for
violations of the Act. However, the Act simultaneously limited the
SEC's regulatory authority over NRSROs. In particular, the SEC is prohibited from "regulating the substance of credit ratings or the procedures
and methodologies by which any NRSRO determines credit ratings."' 4
NRSROs have already evidenced an intent to use this language to
severely limit the SEC's purview.
This Article draws upon the works of scholars who have challenged
the conventional wisdom that reputational concerns alone are always
sufficient to prevent gatekeepers from inaccurate certification. 5 This
Article argues that reputational incentives are insufficient to insure accurate ratings under certain circumstances. In particular, reputational
incentives are insufficient in new market segments, market segment in
which there are a small number of issuers wielding substantial power
and ratings driven markets. In making this point, the Article will draw
upon evidence of the NRSRO's failures with respect to ratings of mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt instruments.
Part I of this Article discusses the role of the rating agencies in the
market for mortgage backed securities and other structured finance products. It also discusses the allegations of misdoing that have been leveled
against the rating agencies. Part II then sets forth the reputational capital
theory of regulation and criticisms that have been leveled against it. Part
III examines situations in which the reputational capital theory may be
11. See, e.g., Role of the Rating Agencies, infra note 22 at 25, at 45-46; Rating Agencies and
the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 35258 (proposed June
12, 2003); Assessing the Current Oversight and Operationof Credit Rating Agencies, S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Mar. 7, 2006.
12. See, e.g., Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820
(January 30, 2003); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 68 Fed.Reg. 5110 (January 31, 2003); Disclosure in Management's Discussion and
Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5982 (February 5, 2003).
13. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78o-7(h) (2008).
14. See 15 USCS §78o-7(c)(2).
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the IrrationalAuditor: A Behavioral Insight
Into Securities FraudLitigation, 95 Nw. U.L. REV. 133 (2000); Frank Partnoy, Barbariansat the
Gatekeepers?:A Proposalfor Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001).
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insufficient to ensure accurate rating and discusses how those situations
relate to the current crisis. Part IV discusses the rating agencies' exposure to liability. It concludes that rating agencies have little to fear from
civil liability which further undermines their incentives toward accuracy.
Part V discusses the regulatory response to ratings failures that precipitated the financial crisis and makes a proposal for rating agency duties
and increased liability.

I.

THE MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES MARKET AND
THE RATING AGENCIES

A.

History of the Rating Agencies

Before the late 1980s most U.S. businesses were local operations
that relied upon personal relationships in order to cultivate customers
and credit.' 6 As the economy grew, so did the scope of business relations. Transactions between persons that had no personal relationship
became more common and this increased the need for reliable information about business entities.17 John Moody is widely credited with starting the first bond rating agency which was formed to address the need
18
for information with respect to the creditworthiness of bond issues.
Moody's synthesized the relevant information about a bond issuance
into an easily understandable symbol that represented the creditworthiness of the issue.' 9 Ratings range from AAA to C, with an "AAA"
rating indicating that the rating agency believes that the bond has a relatively low chance of defaulting, an "AA" rating indicating a slightly
greater chance of default than an "AAA" rated bond and so forth.2 ° In
the years that followed Moody's incorporation, several other credit rating agencies were founded.2 1 The agencies have expanded their rating
services to include not only ratings of corporate bonds but issuances of
16. Richard Sylla, A HistoricalPrimeron the Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 19, 23 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Douglas L. Bendt et al., The Rating Agencies' Approach, in THE HANDBOOK
OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SEcURIms (Frank Fabozzi ed., 2002) (explaining how rating agencies
rate mortgage backed securities); Michael F. Molesky, An Overview of Mortgage Credit Risks
from a Rating Agency Perspective, in THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET: A HANDBOOK OF
STRATEGIES, TECHNIQUES, AND CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY MORTGAGE FINANCE 317
(Jess Lederman ed., Probus Publishing Co. 1987) (explaining the rating agency view of credit
risks of mortgage backed securities).
20. See Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, Dec. 1, 2008 available at http://www2.
standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/RatingsDefinitons.pdf;
Fitch Ratings Definitions,
available at http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/fitchResources.cfm?detail=l&rdfile=ltr#
NLTR (last visited Mar. 29, 2009); Moody's Rating & Symbols, http://www.rbcpa.comMoody'sratings.anddefinitions.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
21. Id. S&P entered the bond rating market in 1916. Id. Fitch was founded in 1913. The
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municipal bonds, mortgage backed securities, and other structured
finance bonds.2 2 A high rating allows the issuer of the bond to offer a
lower interest rate to investors purchasing the bond.2 3
Regulators began incorporating credit ratings into the regulatory

scheme for banks in the early 1930s. The Banking Act of 1935 provided
that national banks could only purchase securities that were investment
securities, which was later defined by the Comptroller of the Currency to
be securities that were not "distinctly and predominately speculative" as
defined by the rating agencies.2 4 Other regulatory bodies soon followed
suit.2 5 These regulations prohibited many of the biggest purchasers of

bonds, like pension funds, insurance companies, and banks, from
purchasing low or unrated debt and, as a consequence, increased the
demand for ratings.2 6
In 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued the first
regulation that relied upon ratings from a Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs) and recognized Moody's, S&P
and Fitch as NRSROs.27 Over time increasing numbers of regulations
conditioned favorable regulatory treatment upon the receipt of investment grade ratings. 28 For example, a money market mutual fund is limited to investing in "eligible securities" which include securities that
receive one of the two highest ratings from an NRSRO.2 9 The DepartHistory of Fitch Ratings, http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/corporate/AboutFitch.faces?context=
1&detail=3.
22. Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE

GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 68-72 (discussing early credit rating practices) (2002); Eamonn
K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understandingthe FinancialCrisis, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 5, 47-51 (2009).
23. Neil D. Baron, The Role of Rating Agencies in the SecuritizationProcess, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION, 81-83 (Leon T. Jendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., MIT Press 1996); Frank
Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of FinancialMarkets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating
Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 653 (1999) (questioning whether the reduction in rate that
comes with an investment grade rating is work the fee paid for the rating).
24. Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 71 (2002).
25. Id. at 70-75.
26. Id.
27. The SEC rule concept was created as part of legislation allowing brokers to set aside
lower reserves for securities that had been rated highly, or investment grade, by credible ratings
agencies.

28. See Partnoy, supra note 24, at 74-75 (listing some of the regulations that incorporate
ratings).

29. Rule 2a-7(a)(10)(i) of the Investment Company Act. State and federal regulations also
give favorable regulatory treatment to instruments that achieve the highest ratings from these
NRSROs and limits certain investors, like pension funds that are ERISA fiduciaries and money
market mutual funds to investments receiving the highest ratings from one of the NRSROs which
gives these agencies a competitive advantage over non-NRSROs. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF
1940 R. 2A-7(A)(10)(I).
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ment of Education uses ratings from NRSROs in setting standards for
institutions that wish to participate in student financial assistance programs. 30 And several state insurance codes rely upon NRSRO ratings in
setting standards for investments by insurance companies.3 1 Many other

institutions' internal guidelines mandate investments that have been
rated by NRSROs.3 2 Even foreign jurisdictions have integrated the use
of NRSRO ratings into their laws.3 3 The designation of a bond as investment grade, then, has important implications on the soundness of many
of the institutions that are integral to our financial system.

NRSRO designation is an extremely valuable asset for a rating
agency to have. Prior to 2007, only four agencies had been designated
NRSROs and of these four Fitch, Moody's and S&P had been
grandfathered in by the rules that created the NRSRO designation. 34 As
a result these three agencies dominate the credit rating market.35

Moody's and S&P combined control 80% of the market for ratings, with
Moody's controlling 39% of the market and S&P controlling 40% of the
market. 36 Together with Fitch these three agencies make up approximately 95% of the market.3 7 It is no surprise then that NRSROs have
played a substantial role in the development of the market for mortgage
backed securities.
B.

The Rating Agencies and Securitization

The origin of mortgage backed securities rests in the nineteenth
century where as early as the 1880s, private mortgage companies had
begun raising capital by issuing bonds which were secured by the mort30.

SEC.

&

EXCH. COMM'N,

REPORT ON THE ROLE

AND

FUNCTION OF CREDIT

RATING

AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/

studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1070, 42 U.S.C. § 2751, and 34 CFR
§§ 668.15(b)(7)(ii) and (8)(ii)).
31. Id.
32. Even where there is no legal requirement to do so, many institutions will limit themselves
to investments rated by an NRSRO. Id. at 28.
33. Id.
34. Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial OrganizationAnalysis, in
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41, 46 (2002). The rating

agencies were designated NRSROs by no-action letters. See Letter from Annette L. Nazareth,
Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation, to Mar-Anne Pisarri, Pickard and Djinis LLP (Feb.
24, 2003).
35. Moody's and S&P combined control 80% of the market for ratings, with Moody's
controlling 39% of the market and S&P controlling 40% of the market. Moody's Corporation
2007 Investors Day Presentation at 10 (Jun 5, 2007); The Economist, Measuring the Measurers,
May 31, 2007; Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 59 (2004).
Together with Fitch these three agencies make up approximately 95% of the market. Id. at 59.
36. Moody's Corporation 2007 Investors Day Presentation at 10 (June 5, 2007); The
Economist, Measuring the Measurers, May 31, 2007; Hill, supra note 35, at 59.
37. Id.
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gages held by the company.3 8 However, this early market encountered
some of the same problems experienced today involving inflated
appraisals and fraud in originations and ultimately collapsed during the
recessions of the 1890s.' 9 Almost a century later, securitization would
find new life in the hands of the federal government.
Prior to the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
mortgage lending was dominated by savings and loans which used the
deposits from their customers to make loans.4 " S&L's, therefore, were
limited in the number and amount of mortgage financing they could provide. 4 ' The FHA was created in 1934 in order to provide stability to the
mortgage lending market. It does so by insuring mortgagors and their
successors in interest against mortgage defaults on loans that have been
underwritten using FHA standards. 42 Between 1938 and 1970, three
government sponsored entities were created in order to facilitate the creation of a secondary market for these mortgages: the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae).4 3 In 1970, Ginnie Mae issued the first mortgage-backed securityi an These certificates "passed through" to investors
the interest income from a diversified undivided pool of mortgages.4 5
As the biggest purchasers of prime mortgages these government
38. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2193
(2007) (citing Michael J. Lea, Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical
Perspective, 7 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 147, 154 (1996)); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J.
Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1369, 1379-80 (1991).
39. Id. at 2193-94.
40. See Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 62-63 (1991)
(discussing the inherent problem with S&Ls borrowing from their depositors in order to make
long term mortgage loans).
41. Id. S&L deposits were short-term deposits which could be withdrawn at any time.
Mortgage loans are long-term. If interest rates went up dramatically S&Ls would face serious
financial difficulty because they would have made long-term mortgages at fixed interest rates that
were now lower than the going interest rates. To keep the depositors from putting their money in
higher yielding investments, S&Ls would have to raise the rates that they paid to their depositors.
This is problematic, however, because, the S&L would not be generating adequate income from
the mortgage loans made in prior years to cover the costs of paying higher interests rates to
depositors. Id.
42. Kenneth H. Sullivan, The Mortgage Market, in HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURrrIES

43.

7 (Frank Fabozzi, ed., 1985).

THOMAS

H.

STANTON,

A

BE THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS

STATE OF RISK: WnL GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

21-23 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 42, at 16. At their inception

Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae purchased only FJA or VA insured loans. In 1970, Fannie Mae's
charter was amended to allow the purchase of conventional (prime) loans. From its inception,
Freddie Mac was permitted to purchase conventional non-FHA or VA insured loans.
44. STANTON, supra note 43, at 22.
45. See JOSEPH Hu, BASICS OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 21-30 (2001).

1120

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1111

sponsored entities ("GSEs") became de facto regulators of the quality of
these mortgages by establishing strict rules regarding what loans they
would purchase. Lenders that wished to sell their loans to the GSEs
would have to use the financial models and comply with strict underwriting standards and documentation standards established by the
GSEs.4 6 Thus, the GSEs played a substantial role in ensuring the quality
of the loans backing the mortgage backed securities they issued and
increasing investor comport with these securities.4 7 It is in part for this

reason that investors do not demand ratings for GSE issued mortgage
backed securities.4 8
Investors were drawn to GSE mortgage backed securities for a second reason: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued securities have been
viewed by the market to carry an implicit government guarantee based
upon the perception that the GSEs were "too big to fail."4 9 In other
words, the market behaves as if the government will bail out the GSEs if
they get into trouble; therefore, the risk of loss associated with securities
issued by the GSEs is lower than with comparable securities. The
implicit guarantee increases the attractiveness of these securities.5 °
Private lending institutions quickly saw the potential of securitization to connect the capital markets with the mortgage market.5" The pri46. Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and Fairer for
America's Families, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/mosehome.htm (last
visited Jan. 16, 2009); Federal Housing Administration, Mortgage Credit Analysis for Mortgage
Insurance on One-to-Four-Unit Mortgage Loans, http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page?-pageid=73,
1824174&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited January 16, 2009) (describing mortgage
underwriting requirements for FHA loans).
47. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues
and New Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1369 ("Governmental efforts to develop the secondary
mortgage market promoted securitization . . . by standardization of mortgages and guarantees of
government-related agencies stimulated public demand for these mortgage-backed securities.").
48. David J. Askin, The Rating of Mortgage Backed Securities, in HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE
BACKED SECURMEs 497, 501 (Frank Fabozzi ed., 1985).
49. In February 2008, the implicit guarantee became explicit when the federal government
seized control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a result of the credit crisis.
50. The value of the implicit guarantee is reflected in the fact that the GSEs can obtain
funding at lower yields than comparable issuers. With non-prime loans, if the borrower is unable
to repay the principle and interest, the lender suffers the loss. In contrast, most prime loans carry
either an explicit or implicit guarantee from federal government. Sullivan, supra note 42, at
15-16; STANTON, supra note 43, at 204.
51. The first private label security was issued in 1977. Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of
Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential,in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION

31, 33-34 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996); Charles M. Sivesind, MortgageBacked Securities: The Revolution in Real Estate Finance, in HousNG AND THE NEW FINANCIAL
MARKETs 311, 321 (Richard L. Florida ed., 1986); Donald S. Bernstein et.al., Comm. on Bankr.
and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured
FinancingTechniques, 50 Bus. LAW 527, 529 (1995). Many investors' investment guidelines had
been written prior to this product's creation and, as interpreted, did not permit investment in
mortgage backed securities. Investors also had difficulty comparing the value of these securities
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vate market for mortgage-backed securities, however, grew outside of
the market imposed by the GSEs. 52 Private label mortgage-backed
securities do not have the benefit of an implicit government guarantee,
and the biggest purchasers of loans were investment and commercial
banks, which did not subscribe to the underwriting standards that the
GSEs had imposed on the prime market 53 . The creation of a market for
mortgages outside of the constraints of those imposed by the GSEs gave
mortgage lenders incentive to lower their underwriting standards and to
sell their riskiest loans to investors. Investors lack the information that
the lender has that would indicate whether or not a borrower is likely to
default. Once the loan is sold, the lender is unaffected by borrower
defaults.54 This information asymmetry allows lenders the opportunity
to profit from the origination of low quality loans, the risks of which are
born by investors. Thus, investors turned to the rating agencies for assurwith other comparable investments because there was no reliable method for valuing the
securities. These hurdles led one of the leaders in the creation of mortgage-backed securities to
remark, "We had a wonderful concept that was a marketplace failure." Ranieri, supra, at 33.The
volume of mortgages that a mortgage company can produce is limited by the amount of capital
available to the company. Private investors in the aggregate possess large amounts of capital but
have generally shied away from investing in mortgages because they lack the ability to cost
effectively originate and monitor mortgages. Securitization solves these problems by aggregating
hundreds, if not thousands, of loans, thereby reducing the risk of loss associated with any
particular loan defaulting. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 535-45
(explaining how securitization changed the mortgage lending market).
52. The GSEs were slow to move into the subprime market. In 2000, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac bought just over 19 billion dollars of the 160 billion dollars worth of subprime loans
outstanding. KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., SUBPRIME MARKETS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., THE ROLE OF GSEs AND RISK BASED PRICING 21 (2002), available at http://www.

huduser.org/Publications/pdf/Subprime.pdf.
53. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 221415 (2007); Non Agency MBS Production by Issuer Type, I THE 2008 MORTGAGE MARKET
STATISTICAL ANNUAL 14 (2008). In 2006 and 2007, investment banks and commercial banks
combined comprised 56.3 % and 68.3 % of the market while GSEs comprised 0.2% and 0.6%
54. It is not uncommon for purchase and sale agreements/pooling agreements to include
recourse clauses requiring that the lender buy back or replace loans that default soon after having
been sold to the mortgage pool. These provisions, however, are only helpful if the lender is
capable of buying back the loan or replacing it. Many of the biggest and most prolific lenders in
the last several years have declared bankruptcy or gone out of business. Participants in the market
for mortgage-backed securities have attempted to address this problem in several ways, including
(1) to make the lender retain some of the credit risk; and (2) by requiring lenders to retain a junior
interest, such as the equity tranche, in the mortgage pool. This position means that the lender will
be the first to suffer losses if the mortgages in the pool default. A lender in this situation is
typically referred to as having taken a 'first loss" position. As demand for mortgage-backed
securities has grown, lender retention of residuals has waned. Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia A.
McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2039, 2066-68 (2007) (explaining that lenders often sell the junior tranches of mortgage backed
securities to investors or into CDOs eliminating their incentive to maximize the credit risk of the
loans).
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ance that the securities would deliver income as promised5 5 . The pri-

mary constraint on lenders and issuers as to quality of the mortgages that
are originated, purchased and sold is whether or not the loans could be
packaged and sold to investors, which was directly influenced by
whether or not the rating agencies would rate the mortgage pools with
those loans. Thus, the rating agencies became the de facto gatekeepers
of the market.56
C.

Ratings and the Credit Crisis

In the last decade investors' appetite for high yielding structured
finance securities seemed insatiable.57 Between 1995 and 2004, the dollar amount of private label mortgage-backed security issuances alone

grew a staggering 1,666%.58
In June 2007, investors' confidence began to falter as a result of
announcements by Moody's and S&P that they would be downgrading
hundreds of subprime mortgage backed securities. 59 Although these
downgrades represented a small fraction of the total outstanding structured finance securities, these downgrades resulted in a shift in investor
sentiment reaching far beyond the specific downgraded securities. By
the fourth quarter of 2007, trading in mortgage-backed securities was at
a near standstill. Investors grew concerned about the quality of the rating
agencies' evaluation of other asset backed instruments. 6' As uncertainty
55. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the FinancialCrisis,
13 N.C. Banking Inst. 5, 48-50 (2009).
56. Leon T. Kendall, Securities: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 1, 16 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996) ("The rating agencies
. . . have become the gatekeepers."); Securitisation: Fear and Loathing, and a Hint of Hope,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2008, at 14 (casting rating agencies as gatekeepers in securitization process).
57. Securitization Ratesfor Home Mortgages, 2 THE 2008 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL
ANNUAL 3 (2008) (giving statistics regarding the growth of subprime originations in 2005, 2006,
2007).
58. Inside Mortgage Finance, Non-Agency MBS Issuance by Type, 2 THE 2008 MORTGAGE
MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL

13 (2008). Over 75% of the subprime mortgages originated in the

first quarter of 2007 were packaged and sold as mortgage backed securities. Securitization Takes
Huge Bite of Early 2007 Mortgage Originations as Bank Retained Portfolios Shrink, INSIDE
MORTGAGE FINANCE, June

59.

STANDARD

&

29, 2007.

POOR'S,

612 U.S.

SUBPRIME

RMBS

CLASSES

PUT ON WATCH

NEG;

10, 2007, at 1-5; Serena Ng & Ruth Simon, Ratings
Cuts By S&P, Moody's Rattle Investors, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2007, at Al.

METHODOLOGY REVISIONS ANNOUNCED, July

60. Several lawsuits have been filed against rating agencies arising out of subprime crisis.
See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harbor View Mortgage Loan Trust 581 F. Supp. 2d
581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (alleging rating agencies assigned higher than warranted ratings to
mortgage backed securities). The rating agencies have also been sued by their shareholders
alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 for misrepresenting or failing to disclose
that the agency had assigned higher than warranted ratings to mortgage backed securities and
other asset backed securities. See, e.g., In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 397
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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about the markets's exposure to subprime mortgage securities grew, risk
spreads on most securities and credit instruments increased.6"
Investors angry about losses related to mortgage backed securities
have demanded answers from the investment banks that sold these
securities, asset managers that invested in these securities, the third parties that insured these securities, and the regulators that were supposed
to be overseeing these entities.62 A good deal of investor anger has also
been focused on the rating agencies and whether they lowered their rating standards in order to continue to receive the massive amount of revenue that was being generated by rating mortgage backed securities.63
1.

HISTORICAL DATA

Many of the allegations against the rating agencies have focused on
the failures inherent in the rating models. Rating models rely upon the
historical performance of a class of assets in order to predict how that
asset is likely to perform in the future. 64 Rating agency critics charge,
61. See, e.g., Bonnie Sinnock, Heavy Selling Seen Widening MBS Spreads to 1986 Level,
Mar. 10, 2008, availableat http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/
premium/archive/?id=158952 (discussing the growing spread between agency mortgage backed
securities and Treasuries); John W. Snow, Medicine for an Ailing Economy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,
2007, at A 11; Leslie Wines, Treasurys Rally On Weak Stocks And Corporate Bonds, Dow JONES
Bus. NEWS, July 26, 2007 (discussing the widening spread between Treasurys and corporate
bonds); Jenny Anderson, Another New York Attorney General Starts a Wall Street Crusade, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at C6 (In July 2007, some subprime-linked collateralized debt obligations
were trading at spreads of 240 basis points over the London interbank offered rate last March).
62. Hundreds of securities lawsuits have been filed related directly to subprime losses. See
Cornerstone Research, Litigation Against FinancialServices Firms Dominates Securities Class
Action Filings, Jan. 6, 2009, http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouseresearch/2008_YIR/
20080106.pdf; Nancy Trejos, Livid Investors Launch A Volley of Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Jan. 18,
2009, at FOI.
63. Hearing, supra note 9; Hearing on the Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 10th Cong. (2008) (discussing rating
shopping). E-mails produced as evidence during the hearing show that investors had been
complaining to the rating agencies about the decline in their rating standards. See, e.g., E-mail
from Mary Elizabeth Brennan to Moody's Subprime Working Group (July 11, 2007 22:55 GMT),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2250 (hereinafter "Brennan email").
64. An important part of the rating process is estimating the expected losses from the asset
pool which will be used to determine the required level of credit enhancements necessary for a
tranche to receive a particular credit rating. Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding
the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Rep. 318 (Mar.
2008), at 40 (hereinafter "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit"); The
Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 110th
Cong. 16-17 (2007) (statement of Mark Adelson), available at htpp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bing/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_househearings&docid=f:39541.pdf. The model for estimating
loss distribution is based on historical data concerning the frequency of default and foreclosure,
underwriting characteristics, and local and economic conditions. Using this model, portfolio
specific estimates and assumptions relating to the probability of default of the obligors in a
mortgage pool, the recovery or loss rates given a default, and the default correlations-the
NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS,
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among other things, that the agencies based their rating models on historical data that did not reflect the characteristics of subprime mortgages
and subprime mortgage pools.

65

Most rating agencies relied upon loan data from 1992 through 2000
in estimating the probability of default and expected magnitude of losses
from subprime loans in a given pool. 66 Using this information to estimate more recent subprime mortgages, however, leads to unjustifiably

low loss expectations for several reasons. First, although subprime mortgages have been around for some time now, subprime originations comprised a small portion of all mortgage lending until 2004.67 Mortgage

data compiled for the period 1992 through 2000 would be a very poor
sample set upon which to evaluate future subprime mortgage
performance.6 8
More importantly, a data set comprising mortgages originated

between 1992 and 2000 will include few of the innovative subprime
69
mortgage products that were popular in the years preceding this

crisis.

Prior to 2002, interest only loans were virtually non-existent in subprime
mortgage pools. The rate of inclusion of 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages
also increased dramatically after 2002. This is significant because interest only loans and adjustable rate mortgages are at a greater risk of
default than traditional mortgages. 70 A 1992 through 2000 data set that
tendency of multiple defaults to occur within a given period of time-the rating agency will
determine the overall credit quality of a pool. Mark H. Adelson, CDO and ABS
Underperformance: A Correlation Story, J. OF FIXED INCOME, December 2003, at 53, 53
(proposes that there was an underestimation of correlations in the rating agencies' default model).
65. Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond
Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market
Disruptions 9-10 n.10 (working paper, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1027475
("However, given the lack of historical default data and the analytical challenges in assessing
credit risk exposures . . . it is likely to be a more important issue in the credit risk than in the
market risk world ....
This applies, in particular, for structured finance instruments .... As a
result, model-based risk assessments can be a long way from 'true' values."); Brennan email,
supra note 63 (challenging Moody's rating methodology).
66. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 64, at 41; Bill Hunt, Glenn Costello, & Suzanne
Mistretta, ResiLogic: U.S. Residential Mortgage Loss Model, Residential Mortgage Criteria
Report at l(Aug. 14, 2007) (Fitch rating model for mortgage backed securities is based upon
performance history of residential mortgages originated between 1992 and 2000).
67. Securitization Rates for Home Mortgages, supra note 57, at 3.
68. Subprime lending comprised 1.4% of all mortgages originated in 1983. By 2000,
subprime loans comprised 10.2% of all mortgages. Between 1994 and 2000, subprime mortgages
grew at an average annual rate of 26%. Sally Pittman, Arms, But No Legs to Stand On:
"Subprime" Solutions Plague the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. Rav. 1089, 1097
(2008).
69. Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime
Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis REv. 31, 41-43 (2006).
70. See generally Donald F. Cunningham & Charles A. Capone, Jr., The Relative Termination
Experience of Adjustable to Fixed Rate Mortgages, 45 J. FIN. 1687, 1702 (1990) (concluding that
adjustable rate mortgages default at greater rates than fixed rate mortgages).
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contains few of the newer mortgage products could not be expected to
have accurately predicted the performance of such products. Yet, rating
agency insiders contend that the agencies were unwilling to implement
newer models that were based upon the newer mortgage products.7"
Thus, the models used to predict the loss estimates for subprime mortgage-backed securities issued after 2002 failed to anticipate the higher
default rates associated with the increased securitization of non-traditional subprime mortgage loans. Second, housing values primarily
appreciated during the period from 1992 through 2000. This meant that
homeowners who found themselves nearing default were able to sell the
home and avoid default and the losses attendant therewith. In fact, a
large portion of outstanding subprime loans defaulted in 2001. In the
fourth quarter of 2002, the delinquency rate for subprime mortgages was
over five times greater than the rate for conventional loans.7 2 The foreclosure rate for subprime loans during this time was 7.79% compared to
0.86% for conventional loans.7 3 Losses from these delinquencies, however, were relatively low because house prices were appreciating over
this period." While house prices were appreciating, homeowners who
could not cure their delinquencies were able to sell, and lenders were
able to foreclose without realizing large losses.7 5
Losses from defaulting mortgages are much higher in a depreciating housing market where defaulting owners cannot sell as fast or for as
much as they can in an appreciating market situation.7 6 By 2005, it had
become apparent that housing values were in fact declining.7 7 Yet, the
agencies were slow to incorporate depreciating home values into their
71. Hearing, supra note 9.
72. The delinquency rate for prime loans was 2.65% in the fourth quarter of 2002, while the
delinquency rate for subprime loans was 13.29% for the same period. MBA Survey Shows
Mortgage DelinquenciesDown in Last Quarter of 2002, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Mar.
24, 2003.
73. Id.
74. STANDARD & PooR'S, S&P/CASE SHILLER U.S. NAT'L HOME PRICE INDEX, Q3 (2008),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/csnationalvalues_112555.xls.
In 2001 and
2002, the indices shows appreciation of between 8% to 11%.
75. Id.; MARK DoMs, FREDERICK FURLONG, & JOHN KRAINER,, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F,
HOUSE PRICES AND SUBPRIME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCIES 2 (June 8, 2007), http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economics/letter/2007/el2007-14.html#subhead3 (hereinafter "House Prices and
Subprime Mortgage Delinquenciesh). The study finds that higher rates of house-price
appreciation are associated with lower rates of delinquencies and that this may because
homeowners in appreciating markets have options other than delinquency.
76. Id. at 2-3.
77. DAVID G. WOOD, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RECENT DEFAULT AND
FORECLOSURE

TRENDS

FOR

HOME MORTGAGES

AND

ASSOCIATED

ECONOMIC AND

MARKET

4, 24 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0878r.pdf; U.S. NAT'L HOME PRICE
INDEX, supra note 75. Housing price appreciation leveled out in 2005 and began declining in
2006.
DEVELOPMENTS
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models. For example, Fitch was relying upon an assumption that home
prices were appreciating as late as March 2007 although median national
home price data showed depreciation of 2.7% in 2006.78 Investors were
rightfully upset upon hearing the news. 79 Relying upon mortgage default
and loss data from the period 1992 through 2000 would lead to an
underestimation of default and loss estimates once the housing market
began declining. This is just what happened.8 °

2.

UNDERWRITING

Investors also accuse the rating agencies of being slow to incorporate the effects of the deterioration of underwriting standards into their
ratings. Declines in the underwriting standards of residential mortgage
loans have been reported, most notably by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, since early 2003.81 In each of the years 2004 through
2007, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported that banks
eased their underwriting standards, with 65% of banks easing standards
in 2007.82 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency indicates in its
2006 report that 26% of banks eased underwriting standards for residential mortgage lending with an increased presence of nontraditional products, such as interest-only loans and payment option adjustable rate
mortgages. 83 Moreover, a 2008 study analyzing the quality of subprime
mortgage loans originated between 2001 and 2007 found that the quality
78. Mason & Rosner, supra note 65, at 25.
79. Investors have become increasingly vocal about the scarcity of information regarding the
assumptions that were used in the ratings of mortgage-backed securities. Mason & Rosner, supra
note 65, at 25; Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction: Structured Finance and Credit Market
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 100 (2009); Letter from the American Bar
Association to Ms. Florence E. Harmon, Acting Secretary, SEC (July 28, 2008), at 8.
80. The same result occurs even if the home ended up in foreclosure. The losses associated
with that foreclosure would be lower than in a declining home appreciation situation. A study
found that half of subprime loans made in 2000 were delinquent at some point and 22.9% entered
into foreclosure proceedings. However, only 12.9% of those that entered foreclosure ended in
foreclosure. 11. 1% of homeowners that entered foreclosure proceedings prepaid their mortgages
prior to having their homes foreclosed upon suggesting that they were able to sell or refinance.
ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES

IN THE SUBPRIME

MARKET AND

THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS,

responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRL-foreclosure-rprt- 1-8.pdf.
81. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
UNDERWRITING PRACTICES

12 (2006), http://www.

2003

SURVEY

OF

CREDIT

(2003), http://www.occ.treas.gov/2003underwriting/creditunderwriting

2003.htm. The OCC reported that 6% of banks eased underwriting standards and that in general
the past year's trend of tightening credit standards had turned.
82. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SURVEY OF CREDIT UNDERWRITING
PRACTICES 2007 4-5 (2007), http://www.occ.treas.gov/cusurvey/2007UnderwritingSurvey.pdf.
83. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Survey of Credit Underwriting
Practices 2006, at 6 (Oct. 2006), http://www.occ.treas.gov/2006Underwriting/2006Underwriting
Survey.pdf.
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of these loans deteriorated steadily over this period.84 The data set of
loans used in this study was comprised largely of adjustable rate mortgages, which typified the subprime market and are now the leading type
of loan in default.
Despite obvious deterioration in subprime underwriting, the rating
agencies did not begin to adjust their rating models until well after the
deterioration began. For example, it was not until April 2007 that
Moody's announced that it would begin to request additional loan level
information with respect to adjustable rate mortgages.8 6 This information included the frequency of interest rate resets, minimum payment
amount and penalty, negative amortization rate and payment options
after adjustment.87 The frequency of interest rate resets, for instance, is
an important factor in determining the likelihood that a borrower will
default on his mortgage.88 So too is the negative amortization rate 9 . Too
often, borrowers with negative amortization loans found themselves
owing more on their homes than they owed when they purchased them,
despite having made timely monthly payments. As housing prices
decline, borrowers may decide that it is more economical to default on
the mortgage rather than continue to overpay for their homes. 9°
Although Moody's is now requesting the information above, such
84.

YULIYA DEMYANYK & OTTO VAN HEMERT, UNDERSTANDING THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE

id= 1020396. The data set of
loans used in this study was comprised largely of hybrid adjustable rate mortgages.
85. The Housing Decline: The Extent of the Problem and PotentialRemedies: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fin., 10th Cong. 1 (Dec. 13, 2007) (testimony of Jack Kemp, Founder and
Chairman, Kemp Partners, available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/
121307testjk.pdf.
86. Moody's Revised U.S. Mortgage Loan by Loan Data Fields, April 3, 2007; See also Fitch,
U.S. RMBS: Criteria Update to REsiLogic Model, August 14, 2007, available at http://www.
fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report-frame.c fm?rpt-id=336966&sectorflag=3&market
sector=-2&detail=
87. Id.
88. Cunningham & Capone, supra note 70, at 1697 (finding that adjustable rate mortgages
with low cap on the total interest rate change and fewer interest rate adjustments have a lower
likelihood of default).
89. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALT. MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: IMPACT ON DEFAULTS
REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT DISCLOSURE OF RISKS TO BORROWERS COULD BE IMPROVED, 13 (2003)
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/do61021.pdf.
90. See Kristopher Gerardi et al., Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership,
and Foreclosures, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. I (Working Paper No. 07-15, 2008), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp07l5.pdf (finding that home price depreciation
plays an important role in generating defaults and foreclosures). Substantial scholarly attention has
been paid to the pricing of mortgages and incidences of mortgage terminations-default,
foreclosures and sales. The option pricing theory posits default and foreclosure as options that
become more rational in response to house price depreciation. See Patrick H. Hendershott &
Robert Van Order, Pricing Mortgages: An Interpretation of the Models and Results, 1 J. FIN.
SERVICES REs.. 19 (1987); James B. Kau & Donald C. Keenan, An Overview of the OptionTheoretic Pricing of Mortgages, 6 1. HOUSING RES. 217 (1995).
CRISIS 18, 21 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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information is still not required in order for an issuer to obtain a rating.
Moody's classifies loan data into three categories: "primary" information, "highly desirable" information, and "desirable" information. 9 Primary information is required to be supplied by issuers who seek
Moody's ratings.9 2 Information classified as "highly desirable" is just
that-desirable. It remains at the discretion of the issuer whether to provide such information. The first month of the interest rate reset, minimum payment amount after reset, negative amortization rate and
payment options after adjustment have all been classified by Moody's as
"highly desirable." 9 3 Therefore it is not clear how much of this information has actually been incorporated into ratings issued after April 2007,
few though they are.9 4
It is clear, however, that rating agencies were aware of criticism of
their ratings models for some time prior to their downgrades. Several
large investors had expressed concerns about mortgage-backed security
ratings and were warning the rating agencies that their models and methodologies were flawed and had even ceased to use ratings in their
purchasing decisions. 95 Some have suggested that the rating agencies
knew that there were problems with their models and that they declined
to fix them because doing so would have negatively impacted revenues.
Frank Raitner, a former managing director at S&P, testified before Congress that the agency refused to implement more accurate rating models
96
in an effort to keep profits high and expenses low.
The rating agencies' reported reactions to investors' complaints
make little sense in the context of the reputational capital argument.
Investors were increasingly indicating that the agencies methodologies
were inaccurate and that the ratings of mortgage-backed securities could
not be trusted. Yet, the rating agencies largely ignored these criticisms.
Such responses are hard to reconcile with the reputational capital argument upon which rating agencies commonly rely as a rationale against
increasing regulatory oversight. Moreover, Mr. Raitner's testimony
before Congress undercuts the agencies' claims of reputational concerns
91. Moody's Revised U.S. Mortgage Loan, supra note 86.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. In addition, several studies have found that faulty assumptions about default correlations
contributed significantly to overestimated ratings for mortgage-backed securities. Mason &
Rosner, supra note 65, at 25-27; Adelson, supra note 64, at 54; Frank Partnoy, How and Why
Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers.in FINACIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY
PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 83-89 (Y. Fuchita & R. Litan, eds.) (2006)
95. Brennan email, supra note 63; see also Aaron Lucchetti, Credit Crunch: Ratings Raised a
Red Flag; Moody_fs Analyst Aired Concerns on CDOs to No Avail, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2008, at
B2.
96. Hearing, supra note 9, at 24, 26.
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as sufficient deterrence. 97 Although S&P denies that it purposely overlooked problems or rejected more accurate versions in order to maximize profits, they and other ratings agencies have admitted to
weaknesses in their models. 98 Yet, they contend that they could not have
anticipated the extent of the defaults and losses. 99 In light of the criticisms and warnings that were being leveled internally and externally, the
rating agencies' assertions that they could not have anticipated the
model failures appear disingenuous.
Although there is at best inconclusive evidence that the rating agencies
purposely used models that would lead to inflated ratings, or that they
purposely ignored red flags regarding the quality of underlying loans,
the premises of the reputational capital argument upon which the rating
agencies so eagerly rely suggest that they should have taken more efforts
to address potential, if not realized, problems. It seems likely that rating
agencies were driven, not by reputational concerns during the height of
the mortgage-backed securities craze, but rather by profit maximizing

impulses.
II.

GATEKEEPING AND REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL

Gatekeeping is a common legal and market mechanism for preventing fraud and other wrongdoing in the securities markets. Gatekeepers
are private entities that certify the quality of the disclosures of securities
issuers seeking to access the securities markets or the relative quality of
the security itself.'0 0 Securities market "gatekeepers" include auditors,
securities analysts, lawyers, and rating agencies.10 1 The rating agencies,
97. Id.
98. See Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 130-31 (2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
documents/20081023162631.pdf. The heads of all three rating agencies testified that there have
been problems with the models that were used to forecast the performance of subprime related
instruments including the historical data used in the models. Id. at 120, 126-27, 130-31.
99. See, e.g., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform 1I0th Cong. 2 (Oct. 22, 2008)
(Statement of Stephen W. Joynt, President and Chief Executive Officer Fitch, Inc.); Credit Rating
Agencies and the FinancialCrisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform,
110th Cong. 2-4 (Oct. 22, 2008) (Testimony of Deven Sharma, President Standard & Poor's).
100. Certifications generally take one of two different forms. The certifications always
establish that the issuer met some minimum standard but it may go further than that and issue a
certification as to the relative quality. For instance, the auditors will certify that the securities
issuer employed reasonable methods to produce its financial statements. The rating agencies issue
certifications as to the quality of the security relative to other like securities.
101. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 n.20 (characterizing accounting, law and investment banking
firms as gatekeepers); David Millon, Who "Caused" the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 309, 311 (2003) (discussing the gatekeeping functions of securities analysts, credit rating
agencies, and auditors).
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for instance, issue certifications in the form of letter ratings which indicate that a security is either low or high quality relative to other securi-

ties. Obtaining this certification is the "gate" that issuers must pass
through in order to gain entree to the securities markets. Because the
certification of these entities is necessary to access the market, they are
in a position to deny market access to securities issuers engaged in
wrongdoing by withholding their certification.' 0 Gatekeepers, however,
can be induced to issue inaccurate certifications by direct bribes from

issuers seeking to obtain a high rating for a low quality security or more
subtle pressure being brought to bear by issuers. 103 Central to the effectiveness of gatekeeping strategies is ensuring that gatekeepers accurately

certify. A gatekeepers' interest in cultivating and maintaining a reputation for honesty is some incentive against inaccurate certification.
The importance of reputation to business entities, and especially
gatekeepers, has long been recognized by economists and in the business
world. Business entities that rely upon repeat business will refrain from

cheating their customers and in doing so they build a reputation for
being honest.'0 4 The reputation has value to the business in so far as it

helps attract customers who rely upon
the good reputation in their search
10 5
for quality services or products.
Much attention has been paid to the role that reputation plays in
disciplining securities market gatekeepers against inaccurately certifying. Several scholars have relied upon the reputation capital theory to
argue that the market generates ample incentives for gatekeepers, like
the NRSROs, to accurately signal quality of securities to purchasers in
the market. 1 6 In this view, imposition of substantial regulations or liability is unwarranted because reputational concerns will be sufficient to
102. Kraakman, supra note 101, at 53 (defining gatekeepers as those "private parties who are
able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.")
103. Following the audit scandals of the 1990s which were typified by Enron, commentators
opined about the extent to which issuers were able to use the purchase of consulting services as
inducement to get auditors to acquiesce in auditing wrongdoing. Robert A. Prentice, The Case of
the IrrationalAuditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
133, 210-11 (2000); Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market's Dependence on Independence: An
Alternative the "Independent" Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347, 348 (2004).
104. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMS 253-54 (Edwin
Carman ed., 1956.) ( "A dealer is afraid of losing his character and is scrupulous in observing
every engagement. When a person makes perhaps twenty contracts in a day, he cannot gain so
much endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make
him lose.").
105. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
106. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 71 (2004); see
also Steven Schwartz, Private Ordering Of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002) ("Rating agencies are already motivated to provide accurate and efficient
ratings because their profitability is directly tied to reputation.").

20091

THE RATINGS GAME

prevent the agencies from inaccurately certifying.1 °7 The crux of this
argument is that NRSROs, as profit maximizing entities, will not jeopardize their primary asset, their reputations, by issuing fraudulent or
inaccurate certifications. 0 8 The long term financial losses that the agencies would suffer as a result of a decline in reputation, perhaps by the
loss of business once it is discovered that they inaccurately certified, will
always outweigh the benefits that were received as a result of that inaccurate certification. 10 9
Ratings agencies have relied heavily on the reputational capital theory in their efforts at escaping substantial regulatory obligations and
oversight."' 0 Following the Enron scandal, the rating agencies beat back
a SEC inquiry into whether they should be more strictly regulated by
relying upon the reputational capital argument."1 ' And Congress has
107. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability
Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 312 (1988) (arguing that "brand name" reputation and
explicit warranties will provide auditors enough incentive to screen companies for fraud); Howell
E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of
Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1072-73 (1993) (questioning the effectiveness of
gatekeeper liability for attorneys); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 916, 951-58 (1998) (proposing a self-tailored liability regime); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper
Liablity, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003) (proposing a diligence based liability).
108. But see Klein & Leffler, supra note 105, at 617, 621 (Reputational concerns are not an
absolute deterrence to corporate deception.); Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Stakeholder
Values, Disclosure, and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 94 (1998) ("Reputation provides a
check on the incentive to deceive, but hardly a complete one.").
109. This argument has been accepted by some courts. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d
624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) ("An accountant's greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed
closely by its reputation for careful work. Fees for two years' audits could not approach the losses
[the accounting firm] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client's fraud ... It
would have been irrational for [firm partners] to have [participated in fraud.]"); Melder v. Morres,
27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[A]ccounting firms-as will all rational economic actorsseek to maximize their profits ... it seems extremely unlikely that [the defendant audit firm] was
willing to put its professional reputation on the line by conducting fraudulent auditing work").
110. In the aftermath of the Enron scandal, the rating agencies came under fire for having
failed to lower the rating on Enron's debt until four days before the company filed for bankruptcy.
In a subsequent investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the
rating agencies were asked about their accountability to investors. The agencies responded that
their concern for their reputations as repeat players in the market is sufficient to ensure

accountability. See

STAFF TO THE SENATE COMM.

OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE

SEC

ON GOVERNMENTAL

AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS

AFFAIRS,

FINANCIAL

(2002) (Despite the rating

agencies assurances, Committee staff concluded that "credit analysts do not view themselves as
accountable for their actions."); see also Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President, Standard &
Poor's Credit Market Services, Testimony Before The Senate Committee On Banking, Housing
And Urban Affairs (Mar. 7, 2006); Kathleen A. Corbet, President, Standard & Poor's, A Division
of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Testimony Before The Committee On Banking, Housing
And Urban Affairs(Feb. 8, 2005).
111. See, e.g., Letter from Leo C. O'Neill, Former President, Standard & Poor's, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (July 28, 2003) (arguing against diligence
requirements and other oversight for the rating agencies); Letter from Charles D. Brown, Gen.
Counsel, Fitch, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (July 28, 2003); Letter
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generally signed on to the reputational capital theory, declining to

impose increased liability or aggressive oversight of NRSROs 2 .
A small group of scholars, however, have challenged the focus on

reputation as sufficient to insure effective gatekeeping. These scholars
recognize private gatekeepers as profit maximizing entities and argue

that reputational incentives are only one factor that gatekeepers look to3
when deciding whether or not to engage in inaccurate certification."

The profit maximizing gatekeeper will balance the short term gains that
could be achieved by making an inaccurate certification with the long
term losses that are likely to be suffered if it is revealed that they inaccurately certified.'I 4 It may be that in many cases this balancing will keep
the gatekeeper from inaccurately certifying. However, in circumstances
in which the benefits from inaccurate certification are greater than the
costs, gatekeepers will inaccurately certify." 5 For instance, some have
argued that accounting firms shift from primarily providing auditing services to providing much more profitable consulting services, increased
the benefits of inaccurate auditing and contributed to the accounting
scandals of the late 1990s.'1 6
from Raymond W. McDaniel, President, Moody's Investors Service, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
U.S. Sec. and Esch. Comm'n (July 28, 2003) (arguing for limited oversight that does not include
exposure to civil litigation).
112. See e.g. Rating the Rating Agencies: The State of Transparencyand Competition, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance & Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, 108th
Cong. (2003).
113. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 202-210 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV.
301 318-323 (2004).
114. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 497; see also Coffee, supra note 113, at 326 ("it could have
become more profitable for firms to realize the value of their reputational capital by trading on it
in the short run rather than preserving it forever."); Klein & Leffler, supra note 105, at 635
(challenging the reputational capital theory as is relates generally to the performance of
contractual duties).
115. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 497; see also Coffee, supra note 113, at 310 (Gatekeepers
may find it advantageous to inaccurately certify when (1) there has been a sudden decline in the
threat of costs of inaccurate certification, (2) the benefit of inaccurate certification has
significantly increased, (3) the value of their reputation has declined, (4) investors come to expect
a certain amount of inaccuracy or (5) principal/agent problems cause agents not to act in a manner
that is contrary to the principles reputational concerns).
116. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 15, at 172; Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make
Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
725, 770 (2003) (discussing the challenge to auditor independence that arose out of auditors
engaging in both the consulting and auditing business.); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale,
Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting
Industry, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1167, 1178 (2003) (an auditor that provides both auditing and
consulting services to the same client is subject to pressure to yield to client preferences on the
accounting treatment of particular matters in exchange for a greater volume of consulting
business, which generated greater profits than the auditing business).
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The ability then of reputational concerns alone to serve as sufficient
incentive for effective ratings then may be affected by the market in
which the agency is rating.
There is much evidence that suggest that rating agencies issued
unwarrantedly high ratings on mortgage backed securities and CDOs. "7
Such behavior by the rating agencies can be explained in light of their
profit maximizing motivations and is not totally inconsistent with the
reputational capital theory. The rapid increase in demand for ratings of
mortgage backed securities and CDOs created an environment in which
the benefits of inaccurate ratings outweighed the potential costs. First,
the profits from issuing inaccurate ratings on mortgage backed securities
were far greater than they had been with respect to inaccurate ratings of
more traditional asset classes. The issuance of inaccurate ratings of
mortgage backed securities created a market in which the rating agencies
were able to generate significantly higher revenues from rating mortgage
backed securities than they had been previously earning.' 18 Second, evidence of rating shopping in the market for mortgage backed securities
and CDOs suggests that the value the agencies placed upon their own
reputations may have declined." 9 Moreover, the value of the agencies'
reputation may have also declined in the midst of the market's exuberance for these investments. Investors' seemingly insatiable demand for
mortgage backed securities may have led them to place a lower value on
the reputation of the agency rating those instruments. Finally, the threat
of liability arising from the rating agencies' inaccurate certification has
diminished in the past several years.' 20 Rating agencies enjoy a unique
position under the securities laws whereby they are not subject to liabil2
ity under Section 11 when their ratings are included in prospectuses.' 1
Thus, liability costs are relatively low for rating agencies and serve as a
weak deterrent to issuing inaccurate ratings.
Before delving into why the rating agencies may have found it
117. See, e.g., CreditRating Agencies and the FinancialCrisis:Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110 Cong. (2008).
118. See Part HI infra.
119. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enterprises of the House
Comm. on Fin. Serv. 65 (2007) (statement of Mark Adelson) .
120. The credit rating agencies have been enormously successful in avoiding liability for
inaccurate ratings. As will be discussed further below, courts have overwhelmingly sided with the
credit rating agencies.
121. Section 11 subjects "experts" to negligence liability for the statements they make in
registration statements. Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) ("The security rating
assigned to a class of debt securities, a class of convertible debt securities or a class of preferred
stock by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization... shall not be considered a part of
the registration statement prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of sections 7 and
11 of the Act.")
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profitable to issue higher than warranted ratings, it is important to understand the role that they played in the market for mortgage backed securities and the current financial crisis. The next section explores how the
rating agencies became an integral part of the formation, growth and
downfall of the mortgage backed securities market. It then discusses the
accusations that rating agencies issued inaccurate ratings on mortgage
backed securities.
III.

REPUTATION MAY BE AN INSUFFICIENT DETERRENT IN
SEVERAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A.

Reputation is an insufficient deterrent in new markets

Proponents of minimal rating agency regulation rely heavily upon
the reputational capital theory in arguing that oversight is unnecessary.1 22 But reputation may be an insufficient incentive to accurately rate
credit instruments when the rated product is new to the market 123 . This
is because the NRSRO has no reputation to loose with respect to rating
the new product 24 . Critics will respond that an agencies' overall reputation will be negatively impacted by inaccurate ratings in the new market
segment 12 5. However, the issuance of inaccurate ratings in one market
segment has very little effect on the agencies reputation in other markets
or its overall reputation. Past NRSRO failures have had little effect upon
an agencies' ability to attract business in market segments unrelated to
the failure 26 .
Following the outcry against the NRSROs performance with
respect to the ratings of Enron's debt, Moody's reported a quarterly year
over year increase in each of the four market segments in which it issues
ratings. 27 This trend appears to be holding with respect to the current
credit crisis. Moody's has reported a substantial decline in revenue in the
structured finance market as a result of declining mortgage backed
securities and CDO issuances. 12 8 However, revenues in the financial
122. See Part II supra.
123. John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the Worldwide Credit Crisis: The Limits
of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposalfor Improvement, COLUMBIA Bus. L.
REV., Vol. 2009, No.1 at 35-48 (forthcoming 2009).
124. See e.g., Id at 40-43 (using econometric model to show that in a multi-period economy
rating agencies may have little incentive to decline to issue low quality ratings).
125. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, supra note 35 at 50-51; Schwartz, PrivateOrdering
of Public Markets, supra note 106 at 6-9.
126. Hunt, supra note 123 at 48 (suggesting that rating agencies face little "negative spillover"
from issuing low quality ratings in new market segments).
127. See Moody's Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 31, 2002).
128. See Moody's Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 20 (Sept. 30, 2008).
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institution and public finance sectors have grown. 129 These results suggest that a negative reputation in one market segment may not impact
revenues in other market segments.
Building upon this trend it is clear the reputational incentives prove
to be insufficient deterrents in new markets. Consider that as much as
rating agencies may care about their reputations, it means very little if
issuers do not solicit their ratings. Issuers will respond to NRSROs that
insist on adhering to stricter rating standards that result in lower ratings
than other rating agencies by taking their business elsewhere. And as the
other agencies would be generating more revenue from rating mortgage
backed securities, it is likely that they would also be generating more
capital from investors. 3 ' This could be the case even if the rating
agency's reliance upon the more conservative assumptions proves to be
correct in the long run as it may be some time before the rating agencies'
conservative approach is proven to be the correct approach. 3 1 In other
words the NRSRO is faced with the choice of issuing inaccurate ratings
and making high profits for some limited period followed by lower profits in that segment or making low or no profits in the segment in every
period 32 . In the context of the mortgage backed securities market of the
last several years, this would have translated into potential losses in the
133
multi-millions.
The rating agencies' income from rating securitized debt shows just
how profitable this market was. The rating agencies' income from structured finance ratings had been growing steadily through the 1990s and
into the early 2000s, but the real estate boom supercharged rating agen-

129. See id. (Public finance grew 10.8%, financial institutions 1.7%. Revenue in corporate

finance declined 8.6%. Similar results can be seen in each quarter of 2008).
130. Moreover, it is more than likely that the rating agency will be subject to and bear cost
associated with any remedial measures aimed at preventing future misbehavior whether or not
they actually engaged in such behavior. Under these circumstances even if the rating agency
acquiesces to issuer pressure, it is no worse off than the other rating agency once the act is
revealed. See Millon, supra note 101, at 23 ("if [an agency] makes an investment decision that
proves to be a loser he or she is less likely to be criticized if others made the same mistake than if
the manager acted in a contrarian manner"); see also David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein,
Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. EcON. REV. 465, 466 (1990) ("[A]n unprofitable decision
is not as bad for reputation when others make the same mistake-they can share the blame if there
are systematically unpredictable shocks."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A
Behavioral Analysis, 1023 U. CINN. L. REV. 1023, 1039-41 (1999).
131. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 8 (2007).
132. Hunt, supra note 123 at 45-48 (attempting to prove this assertion using econometric
modeling).
133. See Part III, supra (discussing the benefits of inaccurate ratings).
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cies' profits 3 4 . In 1998, Moody's revenue from rating structured finance
instruments was approximately $143 million or 29% of total revenues. 135 In just four years revenues had more than doubled to just over
$381 million.136 And this was before the real estate market really began
to climb. By 2006, revenues from rating structured finance products
were just shy of $886.7 million and comprised 44% of Moody's total
revenue. 37 Actual revenue generated from rating mortgage backed
securities for S&P and Fitch are not publically available.' 3 8 However,
the fact that S&P has approximately the same market share as Moody's
suggest that their revenues are comparable.' 3 9 Under the circumstances,
the profit maximizing choice is to issue inaccurate ratings.
B.

Reputation may be insufficient where there are a small number of
issues wielding substantial market power

A common criticism of the reputational capital standard for regulating NRSROs is that reputational incentives are often outweighed by the
conflict of interest inherent in the issuer pay model 4 '. NRSROs counter,
and policymakers have seemingly accepted the argument, that no single
issue comprises enough of the agencies' revenues or is likely to pay fees
high enough to induce a rating agency to compromise its ratings or reputations.' 4 ' Whatever merit this argument may hold in markets where
there are a substantial number of issuers, it is clearly unsustainable in
markets with a limited number of issuers.
The reality is that there are significant distinctions between issuers
of corporate bonds and issuers of mortgage backed securities that could
lead rating agencies to acquiesce to demands for unwarranted ratings in
one market segment and not the other. While there are thousands of
different entities, both business and municipalities, that comprise the
universe of corporate bond issuers, issuers of mortgage backed securities
are a much smaller and more homogeneous group comprised of a few
134. See e.g. Aaron Lucchetti, Ratings Game: AS Housing Boomed Moody's Opened Up,
WALL ST. J., April 11, 2008, at Al.
135. Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (March 15, 2001). The company does
not specify how much of the revenues from rating structured finance products can be attributed to
mortgage backed securities specifically.
136. Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-k), at 17 (March 21, 2003).
137. Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-k), at 20 (March 1, 2007).
138. S&P is a subsidiary of the McGraw Hill Companies which does not release separate
financial information for the rating division. Fitch is a subsidiary of the French company Fimalac
which does not release revenue figures for the ratings division.
139. See REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 30.
140. See Parmoy, The Siskel and Ebert of the FinancialMarkets? Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 24, at 648-654.
141. See Part 1I supra (discussing reputational arguments relied upon by the rating agencies).
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very powerful investment banks and mortgage companies. 142 More
importantly, mortgage backed securities issuers access the credit markets on a much more frequent and regular basis than do corporate issuers
and as discussed earlier they generate much greater fees and revenue
than do corporate clients 14 3 . As a result, mortgage backed securities issuers have much more leverage to use in an effort to force rating agencies
to issue the ratings they desire." In fact, the prominence of rating shopping in the mortgage backed securities market suggests that reputational
concerns were in fact outweighed by the agencies' interests in maintaining their market share.145
Rating shopping occurs when an issuer presents its mortgage
backed securities to multiple rating agencies and selects the rating
agency that grants the highest rating. 4 6 It is made possible in part
because under the current ratings process a rating agency is only paid if
the issuer chooses to have the agency issue the rating. 147 Thus an issuer
is able to obtain a preliminary rating from each rating agency and then
chose to publish the highest rating. The issuer can play the rating agencies against each other by threatening to take the deal to another agency
if they do not receive the rating they desire. This led rating agencies to
148
attempt to "win" business by relaxing their ratings standards.
Rating shopping was a common practice in the mortgage backed
securities market and raised concerns among many industry experts
prior to the credit crunch. In written testimony before Congress, one
securities expert testified that "it is indisputable the securitization issuers
in the MBS, CMBO, and CDO areas engage in ratings shopping. They
do so openly." 149 Evidence produced at a congressional hearing held
142. Nine of the top ten private label issuers in 2007 were either commercial banks or
MORTGAGE STATISTICAL ANNUAL Vol. 1 at 16.
143. This is born out by the number of mortgage-backed securities issues done in the years
2004 through 2007 by the top non-GSE issuers. See THE 2008 MORTGAGE STATISTICAL ANNUAL
vol. 1 at 16-19. No single corporate client could ever be expected to issue this many bonds in one
year.
144. John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law Columbia University Law School,
Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Apr. 22, 2008).
145. See id.
146. See Mark Adelson, Rate Shopping-Now the Consequences, NOMURA FIXED INCOME
RESEARCH, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/Rating-Shopping.pdf.
147. 73 C.F.R. §§ 36212, 36216 (2008).
148. Id.
149. The Role of CreditRating Agencies in the Structured FinanceMarket, HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance & Gov't Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv., 110th Cong. 65 (2007) (Statement of Mark Adelson); see also Aaron Lucchetti, BondRating Shifts Loom In Settlement-N. Y. 's Cuomo Plans Overhaul of How Firms Get Paid, WALL
ST. J., June 4, 2008, at CI ('there is a lot of rating shopping that goes on ... What the market
doesn't knows who's seen' certain transactions but wasn't hired to rate those deals."); 73 Fed.
Reg. 36212, 36218.

investment banks. See THE 2008
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recently suggest that the rating agencies were worried about losing clients to rating agencies that used more generous standards. 5 ' In an email
from May 2004, a managing director at S&P laments the loss of a large
mortgage backed securities deal to Moody's. 5 ' S&P was not chosen to
rate the deal because it was requiring credit enhancement to account for
certain interest rate risks that Moody's was apparently ignoring. 5 2 The
director suggests that S&P needs to "have a paradigm shift in thinking,"
implying that unless S&P takes a position similar to Moody's it will
continue to lose deals. 5 3 Former industry insiders have recounted specific instances in which management relaxed standards or pressured analysts to give favorable ratings to mortgage backed securities and
CDOs.

154

Moreover, although the rating agencies deny that they relaxed their
standards, the SEC has recently issued a report finding that the rating
agencies frequently made adjustments to their rating standards and models when issuing ratings.' 55 Without identifying the agency, the report
finds that one agency regularly lowered the loss estimates that were indicated by their statistical models and did not disclose this practice. 156 The
report also finds that rating agencies used cash flow models that were
57
not incorporated into their published models or publically disclosed.
In many of these cases the rating agency had no documentation explaining the deviation from the model's outputs. At least two of the three
rating agencies frequently used such "out of model adjustments" accord58
ing to the report.'
If the rating agencies and their proponents are correct that reputational concerns alone are sufficient disincentive to issuing inaccurate rat150. CreditRating Agencies and the FinancialCrisis, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/2008
1023162631 .pdf
151. Credit Rating Agencies and the FinancialCrisis, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 84-86 (2008), availableat http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
2008102316263 .pdf
152. See id. at 86.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., The FinancialCrisisand the Role of FederalRegulators, Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 73, 213 (2008), available at http://oversight.
house.gov/documents/20081024163819.pdf; Elliot Blair Smith, Race to Bottom at Moody's, S&P
Secured Subprime's Boom, Bust, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008 ("the [standard] shifts and shifts,
and can shift quite a bit.").
155. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION
STAFF'S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 14, 19 (2008) available at http:/
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf.
156. See id. at 14.
157. See id.
158. Id.
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ings, rating shopping should not be a problem.15 9 Rating agencies could
not be induced to relax their standards because to do so would be injurious to their reputations and long term financial prospects. However, as
the discussion above indicates the agencies were not only concerned
with the impact strict credit criteria would have on their revenues, but
there is evidence suggesting they lowered their standards in response to
issuer pressure.
For better or worse, the securitization is likely to be with us for
many years to come despite the current crisis 6 '. This also means that
the concentration of issuers in structured finance markets like the market
for mortgage backed CDOs is likely to persist. This concentration arises
from the fact that there are only a few institutions that have the capacity
to purchase large quantities of debt and to package them into marketable
liquid securities. Because these issuers will dominate the market they
will continue to have a significant amount of market power.
C.

Significant investors may not be basing their purchasing
decisions on reputation

Increased leverage or pressure from issuers may not be the only
explanation for rating agencies' lack of accuracy. The regularity of ratings shopping may also suggest that investors were not relying upon
ratings for their accuracy. 6 ' The foundation of the reputational capital
theory is that rating agencies and other gatekeepers view their reputations as paramount because investors punish agencies with bad reputations by refusing to do business with them.' 6 2 A market rife with ratings
shopping investors should at a minimum demand a discount for
accepting such ratings. Yet, during the past several years, rating agency
revenues have increased dramatically, primarily as a result of ratings of
mortgage backed securities and other structured finance products.
One reason for this may be that in the last two decades the growth
of mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors has
changed the face of the market. 6 3 An ever increasing number of investors now invest through mutual funds, pensions and other
159. Prentice makes a similar claim with regard to the practices that were prevalent in the
auditing market prior the audit scandals of the 1990s.
160. Mara Derfovanesian, A Smart Idea Spoiled, BUSINESS WEEK, July 7, 2008 at 40.
161. This argument forms the bases of several articles written by Frank Partnoy. See, e.g.,
Partnoy, supra note 23; Partnoy, supra note 24.
162. See Part IHsupra.
163. Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New
Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 348 (2009) ("[A]s of December 31, 2006, the
assets under management of domestic mutual funds comprised 54% of the combined aggregate
market capitalization of the NYSE and Nasdaq.").
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intermediaries. " Assets managed by mutual funds between 1990 and
2006 increased 14.35% annually. 1 65 Pension funds increased from
$5,086.3 billion in 1994 to $14,027.6 billion in 2007.166 These institutions are often restricted by state and/or federal regulations to investing
in securities that have been rated "investment grade."'' 67 As the number
of institutional investors grew so too did the demand for highly rated
products. Much of the structured finance market, which includes the
the curmortgage backed securities and CDOs that are at the center of1 68
rent crisis, are designed to obtain an investment grade ratings.
Many of the financial managers of these institutional investors,
however, have internal analytics specialists and profess not to place
much emphasis on the ratings given by NRSROs 169 . This suggests that
some very significant investors are not basing their purchases of ratings
upon the reputation of the NRSRO. Institutional investors' regulatory
induced need for investment grade ratings has created an environment in
which NRSROs maintain a market for their ratings as long as they issue
high ratings on desirable securities. Institutional investors are not solely
motivated to purchase ratings because of their accuracy and informational value but must do so if they wish to purchase a particular class of
assets whether or not they believe that NRSROs have a reputation for
accuracy. 17 ° Reputational incentives for the NRSRO to rate below
investment grade are therefore weakened.

IV.

THE THREAT OF RATING AGENCY LIABILITY DECLINED
WITH THE ENACTMENT OF THE CREDIT RATING
AGENCY REFORM ACT OF

2006 2

The potential for liability is one of the major deterrents to wrongdo164.
165.
166.
167.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 349.
In fact 98% of subprime mortgages were financed by bonds rated investment grade, AAA

to BBB-, 80% of these were financed by bonds rated AAA. IMF,

GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY

REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS,

59 (Apr. 2008),

availableat http://www.imf.org/extema/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/0l/index.htm.
168. Among the largest purchasers of mortgage backed securities are institutional investors

like pension funds, banks, and savings and loans. Inside Mortgage Finance, supra note 58;
Kenneth R. Hamey, Mortgage BargainsAvailable, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1985, at El; Vikas Bajaj
& Christine Haughney, More People With Weak Credit are Defaulting on Mortgages,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2007, at C2; Steven Pearlstein, Credit Market's Weight Put Economy on Shaky Ground,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2007, at DOI; Ruth Simon et al., Housing-Bubble Talk Doesn't Scare Off
Foreigners; Global Investors Gobble up Mortgage-Backed Securities, Keeping Prices Strong,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at Al.
169. Houman B. Shadab, supra note 7 at 52.
170. Partnoy, supra note 23, at 653.
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ing for most business entities.' 7 1 The rating agencies, however, have

largely avoided liability for inaccurate ratings. One of the agencies'
more successful defenses against liability is grounded in the First
Amendment 1 72. The agencies have asserted that they are financial publishers and that their ratings are matters of public concern.1 73 As publishers they assert that they are entitled to the heightened protections of the
"actual malice" standard 174 . A publisher will not be liable for false statements unless the statement is made with knowledge that it was false 1 or
75
with a reckless disregard for its truth or falsity (i.e. actual malice).
The agencies have also argued that their ratings are protected by the
First Amendment for a second and more important reason. The Supreme
Court has extended full constitutional protections to opinions that do not
contain "provably false connotations;" therefore, such opinions are incapable of forming the basis of liability. 176 The rating agencies contend
that their ratings are nothing more than opinions as to the future performance of an issuer or asset pool. 17 7 As such, ratings are incapable of
being false or true and fall under the full protection of the First Amendment 7 8 . Most of the courts hearing claims against the rating agencies
protections to the rating agencies relyhave extended First Amendment
79
arguments.'
these
upon
ing
Interestingly, the cases in which courts have rejected the agencies'
First Amendment arguments have involved instances in which the rating
171. See SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 1
(1978) (noting that a common rationale for imposing negligence liability is deterrence); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007) (same).
172. Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1689-92 (2008) (discussing rating agency
success with First Amendment defenses); Partnoy, How and Why CreditRating Agencies Are Not
Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 94 at 83-89.
173. STANDARD & POOR's, A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2990 (2005) at 17, available
at www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/3,1,1,0,1121065383180.html.
174. County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 245 B.R. 151, 154-57 (C.D. Cal. 1999)(the
court found that the actual malice standard applies); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derv. & ERISA Litg.,
511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825 (S.D. Tx 2005) (same).
175. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 280 (1964); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
176. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
177. Letter from Raymond W. McDaniel, supra note 111.
178. Id.
179. See Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir.
2007) (public concern); County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 245 B.R. 151, 154-55 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (applying actual malice standard); Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's
Investor's Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999) (ratings are non-falsifiable opinions); In re
Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rating agency was an journalist entitled to
First Amendment protections). But see Am. Say. Bank, FSB v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24102 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Anderson LLP, 94
P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 4 2004).
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agency did not publish the rating in question in their subscriber based
newsletter, but instead, the ratings were contracted for by the issuer and
paid for by the issuer.' 8 0 It may be that the First Amendment is not a
viable defense to claims arising out of the rating agencies issuances of
issuer paid ratings. If this is the route courts ultimately take it could have
major implications for the agencies as much of their revenue is derived
from the issuer paid business model.' 8 ' Certainly, ratings of mortgage
backed securities were paid for by the issuers of those securities. In any
event, the rating agencies have largely been shielded from liability for
their ratings.
Still, the protections afforded rating agencies under the First
Amendment do not fully explain why rating agencies would have been
incentivized to overestimate ratings of mortgage backed securities. After
all, the rating agencies' immunity from civil liability was well established prior to the uptick in mortgage backed securities that led to the
current crisis. 18' The factor that changed the balance of the scales was
the enactment of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (the
"CRARA"). 83 The CRARA was enacted with the purpose of "improving ratings quality" and promoting "accountability, transparency and
competitions in the credit ratings industry." '8 4 The CRARA changed the
process by which rating agencies received recognition as NRSROs and
ordered the SEC to adopt rules regarding the adoption by NRSROs of
procedures designed to prevent the misuse of information and manage
85
conflicts of interest.1
The CRARA also contained provisions that arguably further weakened civil liability as a constraint upon the rating agencies. The CRARA
does not create a private right of action against the rating agency for
violation of any of its provisions. 86 More importantly, it could be read
as supporting the rating agencies claims to First Amendment protection.
The CRARA makes clear that a rating agency registering as an NRSRO
180. Am. Sav. Bank, FSB, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24102; Commercial Fin. Services, Inc., 94
P.3d at 110.
181. See Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 29, 2008). In 2007,
revenues from subscription based research totaled $421.5 million representing 18% of total
revenues. Ratings revenue for the same year totaled $1,779.9 or 78% of total revenues. Id.
Moreover, from 2005 to 2007, subscription based revenues consistently comprised approximately
17-18% of Moody's revenue. Id.
182. See, e.g., In re Pan Am Corp., 161 B.R. at 586; see also Gregory Husisian, What Standard
of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency
Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 413-14 (1990) (reasoning that the First Amendment should
shield the rating agencies from liability for inaccurate ratings).
183. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006).
184. Id.
185. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78o-7(g)(1) (LexisNexis 2009); 15 USCS § 78o-7(h)(1).
186. 15 USCS § 78o-7(m)(2).
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does not constitute "a waiver of, or otherwise diminish, any right, privilege or defense that a nationally recognized statistical rating organization may otherwise have" under state or federal law.' 8 7 In light of the
several court decisions extending First Amendment protections to ratings, of which Congress clearly knew of at the time of the CRARA's
passage, this provision could be used as evidence of Congress' tacit support of the rating agencies First Amendment defense' 8 8 .
Moreover, even if the First Amendment defense is ultimately found
not to apply in the context of ratings, provisions of the CRARA could be
interpreted as limiting liability in general. The CRARA expressly forbids the SEC or any state from regulating the substance of the ratings. 8 9
Just what constitutes regulation of the "substance of ratings" is not
addressed in the act or in the legislative history for the act.' 90 However,
the rating agencies have already taken an expansive view of its scope.
Moody's has argued that the provision preempts all state securities laws
as they apply to NRSROs. 191 In the case in question, the court refused to
hold that the presumption that Congress does not intend to overturn state
law had been overcome.' 9 2 Furthermore, the court rejected Moody's
broad interpretation, instead reflecting that the CRARA provision
"seemed to mean that states may not tell NRSROs what ratings they
should give or dictate how they arrive at their ratings."' 9 3 The decision,
however, seems to rest to some extent on the courts unwillingness to
apply the CRARA to conduct that occurred prior to the enactment of the
CRARA. 194 The conduct in question occurred in 2000 and 2001 and the
complaint was filed in June 20031. This leaves open the question of
whether courts may be more amenable to the rating agencies preemption
arguments for incidents arising after the enactment of the CRARA.
187. 15 USCS § 78o-7(m)(1).
188. Kettering, supra note 171 at 169 (raises the potential argument that the CRARA impliedly
forecloses rating agencies from raising the First Amendment defense).
189. 15 USCS § 78o-7(c)(2) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the
Commission nor any State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of credit
ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating
organization determines credit ratings.").
190. The CRARA gives no guidance as to what actions might constitute regulating the
substance of credit ratings. The SEC expresses its belief that requiring NRSROs to make and
keep certain records relating to the conduct of its business and prohibiting NRSROs from
modifying or threatening or offering to modify a rating in a manner contrary to its procedures does
not contravene the CRARAs prohibition on regulating the substance of ratings. 72 Fed. Reg.
33564, 33601, 33585.
191. In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enter., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 650 (S.D. Ohio

2008).
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 651.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
Id.
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A final point that arises out of the CRARA concerns the interaction
between the provision prohibiting regulation of the substance of rating
and the provision preserving the rights of state securities commissions to
bring actions for fraud and deceit against NRSROs. 9 6 The CRARA's
prohibition on regulating the substance of ratings, read in conjunction
with the exception for state fraud and deceit actions, could be used to
argue that the only state law actions a state commission is permitted to
bring against NRSROs are fraud or deceit actions' 9 7 . In fact, in 2002 the
Senate Committee on Government Affairs published a report that noted
that NRSROs are "officially" protected from liability for "all but fraud
under the securities laws' 9 8 ." In any event, it is clear that the CRARA
provided the rating agencies with several more bases for arguing that
they are not subject to liability. In doing so the CRARA further weakened the effect of liability as deterrence to rating agency misrating.
V.

A

PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION OF

NRSROs

The inclusion of ratings into so many facets of the financial regulatory scheme has given the Moody's, S&P, Fitch and other NRSROs a
quasi-regulatory role and resulted in their ratings having a [serious]
impact upon the U.S. and global financial markets. Despite this,
NRSROs owe no clear legal responsibility to the public to rate with care.
At present, the regulatory scheme for NRSROs requires mandatory disclosures be made by rating agencies as to their rating policies and methodology. These disclosures have been enhanced in the wake of the
financial crisis. 199 However, the regulatory regime involves very little
direct oversight of the performance of an NRSRO for the purpose of
preventing or punishing poor performance. This section discusses the
disclosure requirements for NRSROs and proposes imposing a diligence
requirement.
A.

Increased Disclosure

Government bodies have scrambled to respond to the NRSROs failures. The SEC has implemented sweeping new rules with respect to disclosures of information used by credit rating agencies in developing
196. 15 USCS § 78o-7(o)(2).
197. And in fact some scholars have pointed out that the CRARA's provisions appear to
preempt many state laws. See e.g. Kettering, supra note 171 at 1688-1689 (arguing that the
CRARA could preempt state tort law).

198.

STAFF TO THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF

SEC AND PRIVATE-SEcTOR WATCHDOGS, 105-106 (2002).
199. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74
Fed. Reg. 6456 (Feb. 9, 2009).
ENRON: THE
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ratings. 2 ' The new rules rightly focus on increasing the transparency
and accountability of the NRSROs. The new rules require that NRSROs:
whether and if so how informa(i) disclose their policies regarding
2 °1
tion used in ratings are verified;
(ii) publish information about ratings actions for enumerated catego202
ries of ratings in order to enhance comparisons across agencies;
(iii) disclose how frequently the agency reviews its ratings and if different criteria is used in the review than was used to issue the initial
rating;

2

01

(iv) make all information used to rate [mortgage backed securities]
available to other credit rating agencies; 2 ° and
(v) document any out of model adjustments made to ratings.2 0 5
The rules are consistent with the SECs broad policy based approach to
rating agency disclosures.
While the disclosures would be helpful, they do not go far enough.
For instance, the new rules only require disclosure of the rating agencies' policies regarding verification of underlying assets and information. The usefulness of such general disclosures is likely to be limited
because such disclosures could be written in a way that would allow a
significant amount of deviation in the use of information and extent of
verification among similarly situated asset backed securities.
NRSROs should be required to disclose, in connection with the
publication of each rating, a summary of the material information that
was used in deriving the rating. While this disclosure would not entail
releasing specific loan level information for each loan in a mortgage
pool, NRSROs would be obligated to reveal exactly what type of loan
level data was relied upon, giving the investor the opportunity to evaluate the limitations of the rating. For instance, simultaneously with the
release of the rating Moody's would disclose the type of optional "desirable" or "highly desirable" information, if any, that was used in determining the rating.
The disclosure described above would be superior to the SEC's initial proposal which would have made public all information used in a
rating.20 6 Many of the comments on the initial proposal to publically
200. Id.; see also Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
73 Fed. Reg. 36212 (June 25, 2008); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. § 40088 (July 11, 2008) (proposing to eliminate references to
nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations from SEC rules and regulations).
201. 74 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6459-60 (Feb. 9, 2009).
202. Id. at 6457-59.
203. Id. at 6459-60, 6474-76.
204. 74 Fed. Reg. 6485, at 6494 (Feb. 9, 2009).
205. 74 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6463 (Feb. 9, 2009).
206. 73 Fed. Reg. 36212, 36219-36222 (June 25, 2008).
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disclose all information used in a rating raised valid concerns about confidentiality 20 7 . In response to these concerns the SEC issued a revised
proposed rule which would make all information used in a rating available to other NRSROs. In exchange for the ability to access this information other agencies will be required to issue a certain number of
unsolicited ratings.20 8 In this way NRSROs would act as checks on each
other. A NRSRO issuing an unwarranted rating would run the risk that
some other NRSRO would issue an unsolicited rating that would bring
the inaccuracy to light. The potential of this provision may be limited,
however, because NRSROs are under no obligation to access such information. The rule instead relies upon market forces to drive NRSROs to
engage in self monitoring. The proposed rule also does little to increase
the market's ability to police rating agencies as the SEC seems to
acknowledge.20 9 Moreover, because the rule expresses a belief on the
part of the SEC that the rating agencies can and will police each other, it
may lead investors to rely even more heavily on rating agencies. An
investor may come to believe that if an agency's ratings have not been
challenged it is because they are accurate. This may be the case but it
may well be that the agencies simply are not policing each other.
It is also important that NRSROs disclose any sources used to verify the information relied upon in determining the rating and the
assumptions made in determining a particular rating. This would include
disclosure of a summary of any diligence conducted by the rating
agency, or provided to the rating agency by any party, used to verify the
accuracy of information provided by the issuer if such information was
used in formulating the rating. And because the ratings of mortgage
backed securities depend upon statistical modeling it is vital that the
assumptions used in these models are also made available. Disclosure of
information used in deriving ratings, methodology and verification are
useless without knowledge of the assumptions utilized in the models.
The benefit of requiring rating specific disclosure is twofold. First,
investors would be able to see whether the rating for a particular security
incorporated pool specific information such as originator characteristics,
debt to income ratios, appraisals, interest and payment reset data and
other loan specific information in generating a rating for the particular
207. See e.g. Dottie Cunningham, Commercial Mortgage Securities Association Comments to
ProposedRules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizationsavailable at www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-18-08/s71808-27.pdf (September 29, 2008).
208. 74 Fed. Reg. 6485, 6496 (Feb. 9, 2009). A non-solicited NRSRO would be required to
certify that it will determine and maintain credit ratings for at least 10% of the issued securities if
it accesses information of solicited NRSROs 10 or more times in a year.
209. 74 Fed. Reg. 6485, 6495 (Feb. 9, 2009) ("The Commission acknowledges that investors
and other market participants may benefit from greater disclosure of this information.").
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security. Based upon this information investors will be able to appreciate
better the scope and limits of a rating. This is in contrast with the more
general discussions of methodology, policies and procedures that rating
agencies currently publish.21 ° Second, such disclosure could enhance the
strength of reputation as a deterrent to inaccurate or insufficient rating
standards. Investors would be able to compare the type and range of loan
level information used by each rating agency forcing the rating agencies
to compete with respect to the optimal levels of loan level information
used in ratings as well as the optimal level of verification. Rating agencies that do not use sufficient ratings standards stand to suffer immediate
reputational-market costs in the form of investors discounting or ignoring their ratings. Investors will be able to discount or discard individual
ratings based on spurious data. Moreover, the regulators will be able to
evaluate rating standards in real time and obtain a clearer picture of ratings practices.
Although these reporting requirements may lead to a better understanding of the limits and scope of ratings, they fail to address the structural problem that has lead to inaccurate ratings which is that NRSROs
occupy a privileged position in the market with no attendant enforceable
duty to accurately rate. This is particularly astounding given the quasiregulatory function that regulators have given to NRSROs.
B.

Increased Liability

The recent failures of NRSROs have revealed the insufficiency of
our current legal regime which imposes limited liability and relies upon
reputation as the principle constraint upon NRSROs. In addition to condition NRSRO status upon the aforementioned reporting requirements,
policymakers should require that NRSROs be subject to diligence obligations. This requirement would oblige NRSROs to use reasonable care
when issuing a rating.
Under this proposal a new body or committee (the "Committee")
would be created within the SEC and vested with the powers similar to
those of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the
"PCAOB"). These powers would include the ability to conduct investigations of alleged violations of the proposed reporting requirement and
breaches of the diligence obligation. The Committee would have the
authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings, impose sanctions, and
subpoena testimony and documents relevant to an investigation.
In the past, the NRSROs have argued that increased liability and
oversight will lead to deadweight losses due to unbeneficial documenta210. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA (2008), available at http:/
/www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/corprate-criteria_2008.pdf.
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tion. The agencies contend that liability and oversight will force agencies to take similar views and stifle their ability to issue useful
opinions" l l . This is a common criticism of negligence regimes which
holds that negligence regimes increase the amount of documentation that
an entity must produce in order to avoid liability, but that this documentation does not increase the quality of the product or service the entity
produces.2 12 As a result, the costs incurred with producing this documentation are pure losses in the sense that they do not produce any benefit. This argument, however, assumes that the rating agencies are
applying the optimal level of care in the absence of a duty to do so. As
discussed earlier in this Article that claim is at best dubious.2 13 Moreover, with respect to NRSROs this argument is undercut by the imposition by the SEC of the documentation and reporting requirements
discussed above. 2 4 Thus, the NRSROs already have to produce such
documentation and incur no increased costs if a diligence requirement is
imposed.
The corollary to NRSROs suffering little reputational or liability
costs from inaccurate ratings is that investors bear the costs of such ratings. The NRSROs argue that this is proper because it makes investors
responsible for their investment decisions.2 15 Certainly, investors must
conduct diligence and bear ultimate accountability for their choices. But
it does not follow that the costs of inaccurate ratings should fall to investors. For one thing the NRSROs are in a better position to assure that
they have taken reasonable care in determining the rating. The usefulness of rating agencies is based upon the difficulty that individual investors have in gathering all the information and developing the expertise
necessary to evaluate securities. The NRSROs have developed the relationships, business models and requisite expertise to conduct credit analysis and assure the accuracy of that analysis at a far lower cost than
investors ever could. Thus, putting the cost of inaccurate ratings on
NRSROs would lead to more accurate ratings at a lower cost.
Scholars have for years debated the advantages and disadvantages
of applying strict liability verses negligence liability regimes to gate-

211. Moody's Comments to Securities and Exchange Commission's Concept Release on
Rating Agencies & the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws (July 28, 2003)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/moodysO72803.htm.
212. See, e.g., Husisian, supra note 182, at 434-35.
213. See Part I supra.
214. See Part IVa supra.
215. See, e.g., Securitisation: Fear and Loathing, and a Hint of Hope, supra note 56, at 14
(with respect to criticisms about their ratings of mortgage backed securities the rating agencies
respond that ratings are not meant to replace investor diligence).
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keepers in general.2" 6 Proposals for strict liability are primarily based on
the argument that it is the most cost effective.2 t 7 Strict liability eliminates the administrative costs associated with defining the contours of
the standard of care and of determining fault or breach of a duty. Moreover, because the gatekeeper is subject to strict liability, it is still incentivized to exercise due care. l8 However, recognizing that a pure strict
liability scheme would likely lead to excessive deterrence, driving gatekeepers from the market altogether, scholars favor modified strict liability regimes which cap the liability of gatekeepers at some determinable
amount.21 9 Proposals have included caps which are established by statute and caps that are established by contract.22 °
Modified strict liability proposals suffer from the same infirmity
that strict liability advocates find objectionable in negligence schemes,
they come with administrative costs. Whether a cap on liability is determined outright by regulators or is the product of negotiation between the
gatekeeper and its principle within minimum levels established by regulators, costs will be incurred in developing the knowledge required to
determine the efficient cap just as costs would be incurred in developing
the appropriate standard of care. Nor is it assured that the administrative
costs of imposing regulatory caps will be lower than the administrative
costs of a diligence based system. Regulators will incur costs associated
with monitoring the effects of the cap and devising a mechanism to
ensure that the cap is kept up to date with changes in the industry. Establishing liability and monitoring levels of caps are likely to involve similar kinds of investigatory inquiry and work as investigating breaches of
duty. Therefore, a modified negligence scheme may be no more costly
than modified strict liability schemes. 2 2'
Strict liability regimes based upon contract and other liability
regimes like them that would allow NRSROs to choose the level of liability they would like to be subject to are unlikely to lead to optimal
ratings accuracy. For one thing, as Professor Coffee points out, issuers
have little incentive to demand high levels of liability and may in fact
use the promise of low levels of liability in order to induce acquiescence
216. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 540-46; Coffee, supra note 113, at 346-49; Hamdani, supra
note 107, at 117-120; Choi, supra note 107, at 951-58.
217. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 540-46; Coffee, supra note 113, at 351-53.
218. Coffee, supra note 113, at 343.
219. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 540-46; Coffee, supra note 113, at 351-53.
220. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 540-46 (proposing contractual caps), Coffee, supra note 113, at
350-53 (proposing regulatory caps).
221. The Committee will also benefit from a wealth of legal development on the issue of
determining the negligence standard of care which may further reduce the administrative costs of
this proposal.
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to wrongdoing.22 2 The possibility of such complicity may be even
greater with respect to ratings markets in which there are a small number
of similarly situated, high revenue generating issuers as is the case in the
structured finance market.22 3
Furthermore, NRSROs are unique among gatekeepers in that they
are not subject to any real threat of civil liability. It is unlikely that an
NRSRO would voluntarily opt into a scheme that imposes greater liability than they would otherwise have. Thus, contractual liability schemes
may not lead to any significant increase in care among rating agencies.
CONCLUSION

The rating failures that precipitated the credit crisis have once again
turned regulators' focus to the rating agencies. As proposals for regulating the agencies move forward, it is imperative that lawmakers recognize that reputational concerns, while an important deterrence to
wrongdoing, have their limits. Hot markets and large profits increased
the benefits of inaccurate ratings significantly. The value placed upon
reputation by both the rating agencies and investors appears to have
declined. The probability of liability for engaging in wrongdoing can
also have a major impact upon whether a rating agency will find it beneficial to inaccurately rate. The task before lawmakers and regulators is to
fashion a system that is flexible enough to capture changes in these variables. Both increased exposure to liability and increased disclosure can
be used to achieve this goal.

222. Coffee, supra note 113, at 351.
223. See Part III supra.

